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1 Introduction
Scale eﬀects in matching models have featured prominently in the economics
literature since Peter Diamond’s (1982) claim that the complementarities in
search models are strong enough to generate multiple equilibria. Theoreti-
cally, scale eﬀects appeared “plausible,” both to Diamond and others. Yet,
despite a small number of exceptions, empirical work has largely supported
constant returns (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The exceptions are not
ones that consistently apply to some cases or some periods. Rather, a few di-
verse estimates support increasing returns, with the vast majority supporting
constant returns.1
Empirical testing, however, usually proceeds by estimating aggregate
matching functions or hazard rates for unemployed individuals. The test
for constant returns in the aggregate matching functions is whether a pro-
portional increase in the inputs of both firms and workers into search (at the
most basic level, in the total number of vacancies and unemployed workers)
increases total matches by a bigger proportion. In hazard-function estimation
the test is the equivalent one of whether a proportional increase in local-area
unemployment and vacancies increases a typical individual’s hazard rate. In
both cases, however, the estimation is on reduced forms. But both aggre-
gate matching functions and individual hazard rates conceal more than one
structural dimension. They are both a composite of the mechanics of the
meeting technology and the willingness of firms and workers to accept the
1Some may claim that the statement in the text is unduly strong. For example, esti-
mates using translog matching functions (like the ones by Warren, 1996 and Yashiv, 2000)
are more supportive of increasing returns than estimates using loglinear functions. Also,
estimates restricted to manufacturing are more supportive of increasing returns than esti-
mates that use whole-economy data (see Blanchard and Diamond, 1990, and again, War-
ren, 1996). But it would be premature to generalize from this small number of examples
and claim that increasing returns are a feature of all such cases.
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other side’s oﬀer.
Our main claim in this paper is that it is feasible for constant returns
in aggregate matching functions and hazard rates to coexist with increasing
returns at one of the micro levels, because the responses of firms and workers
to the increasing returns can cancel out their eﬀects at the aggregate level.
The most clear case where this can happen is in the quality of the job match.
There may be increasing returns in the quality of job matches, with better
matches occurring in larger markets. But if reservation wages increase in
proportion to the improvement in the quality of job matches, the aggregate
matching function should be independent of scale. The increasing returns
would be associated with higher post-unemployment wages but not with
shorter durations of unemployment.
We outline a standard model of search and make the theoretical case for
the co-existence of increasing returns at the structural level and constant
returns at the aggregate level. We show that at the structural level scale
eﬀects could be observed at two levels: at the level of the arrival of job oﬀers
and at the level of the quality of the job match. If scale eﬀects are due to faster
arrival of oﬀers, reservation wages could oﬀset completely their eﬀects on the
aggregate hazard rate (and consequently on the aggregate matching rate).
But whether they do or not depends on the properties of the distribution of
job oﬀers, as previously shown by Burdett (1981) and others. If the scale
eﬀects are in the quality of the job match, theory predicts that reservation
wages change to oﬀset their impact on the hazard rate only if the worker’s
unemployment income is small.2
We estimate our model and look for scale eﬀects at the structural level
2The impact on observed hazard rates is also oﬀset if unemployment income depends
on the local wage oﬀer distribution which is not relevant for a cross-section of local markets
subject to the same unemployment insurance regime.
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by making use of a British sample of 3,000 unemployed individuals. We can
do this because in addition to the usual variables (personal and local labor-
market characteristics at the county level, censored and uncensored durations
of unemployment and post-unemployment wages) it also contains information
on reservation wages. We decompose hazard functions into the probability
of receiving an oﬀer and the probability of accepting it, and estimate the
influence of personal and local labor-market characteristics on each.
We find scale eﬀects in the quality of the job match (proxied by the mean
of the wage oﬀer distribution) but not in the arrival of job oﬀers. But we
also find that reservation wages increase to oﬀset the impact of increasing
returns on the unemployment hazard rate. Because in larger markets work-
ers search with higher reservation wages, the eﬀect of scale shows up as a
higher post-unemployment wage and not as a shorter duration of unemploy-
ment. Aggregate matching functions derived from our sample would confirm
constant returns.
Theory suggests that in this case reservation wages should compensate the
eﬀects of scale only if unemployment income (net of search costs) is small. We
show that our estimates imply that even conventionally “high” replacement
ratios, 40% of t he me an wage rate net of search c osts, i mply that the
scale eﬀects in the quality of job matches should be reflected primarily on
post-unemployment wages. A small eﬀect on hazard rates remains but we
argue that it is suﬃciently small that reduced-form estimation is not likely
to pick it up.
Our estimates of the structural equations contain a serendipity. The
aggregate matching function is a black box, in the sense that not much is
known about its internal structure and microfoundations. Our objective here
was not to probe into the microfoundations of matching functions, but our
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analysis implies some restrictions that should prove useful in future work:
namely, shifts in variables that influence the search process through the mean
of the distribution of wage oﬀers are reflected mainly in shifts in the post-
unemployment wage distribution, with virtually no influence on matching
rates. And shifts in variables that act through the mechanics of the meeting
technology are reflected in shifts in the matching function, with virtually no
influence on the post-unemployment wage distribution. Theoretical studies
of the foundations of matching functions will do well to focus on the me-
chanics of the meeting technology, rather than the structure of the wage
oﬀer distribution and the formulas for reservation wages.
Our local market is the county. There are 66 counties in Great Britain,
with mean employment level 322,285 people and range 6,000 to 3,515,400.
As a test of robustness of our results we re-estimate the model by exclud-
ing all observations from London, ab out 12% of our sample. London
is counted as a single unit and it is an outlier in the county size distri-
bution. Compared with London’s 3.5m, employment in Birmingham, the
second largest county, is 1.1m. We find no scale eﬀects in the smaller sam-
ple. This opens up the possibility that scale eﬀects in the quality of matches
operate only in very large markets, which oﬀer a large choice of diverse oc-
cupations. But our sample contains only one very large market, so further
tests are needed before either constant returns or non-monotonicity in scale
eﬀects can be established as a more general property of search markets. We
speculate further on these possibilities in the concluding section of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline an infinite-
horizon search model and show the eﬀect of changes in both the arrival rate
of job oﬀers and the mean wage oﬀer on the job-finding rate. Section 3
describes our data set and presents some preliminary evidence. In Section 4
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we specify the likelihood function and estimate the model, letting both the
arrival rate of job oﬀers and the mean wage oﬀer depend on individual and
lo cal l ab or market characteristics. The results are di scussed in Section 5.
Section 6 quantifies some other eﬀects on hazard rates and compares scale
eﬀects with those of tightness and education in re-employment prospects.
General conclusions are brought together in Secti on 6.
2 Model
We begin by describing the empirical problem. An unemployed individual
searches for a job in a local labor market. Oﬀers arrive randomly according
to a Poisson distribution with parameter p(x), where x is a vector of personal
and local labor-market characteristics. When an oﬀer arrives, the individual
has the option of accepting a wage which is randomly drawn from the known
and fixed distribution F (w). We assume that F (w) is lognormal with mean
µ(z), where z is another vector of personal and local labor-market character-
istics, and standard deviation σw, which is a fixed parameter. If the worker
accepts the oﬀer she leaves unemployment and earns w for the duration of
the job. If she rejects the oﬀer she waits for a new oﬀer to arrive, and on
average one does after 1/p(x) periods. The stopping rule is governed by the
reservation wage w∗, which is a choice variable. The unemployment hazard
rate is h, defined by:
h = h(x, z) = p(x)(1− F (w∗;µ(z), σw)). (1)
Our data contains information on w∗ and unemployment durations for
each individual (from which we can make inferences about h), and on a
variety of personal and local labor-market characteristics, which are candi-
dates for the vectors x and z. This allows us to estimate p(x), µ(z) and σw
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for each individual, conditional on the distribution F and on an optimizing
search model. Our primary interest is two fold. First, to identify separately
whether scale eﬀects aﬀect the oﬀer arrival rate or the mean of the oﬀer dis-
tribution; formally, whether the vectors x and z contain variables for the size
of the local labor market. Second, to compute the reaction of reservation
wages to the vectors x and z, and from these to obtain the reduced form
hazard function. The key question is then whether the size variables can in-
fluence either p or µ, where intuition about scale eﬀects normally applies, but
not the hazard rate, because of the dependence of the latter on reservation
wages.
The search model is a conventional continuous-time model for an unem-
ployed individual with infinite horizon looking for a permanent job. The
labor market environment is stationary and the unemployment hazard in-
dependent of duration. The model is partial, in the sense that both p and
F (w) are exogenous, neither depends on time or search duration and succes-
sive wage oﬀers are independently distributed. A job is an absorbing state,
once one is accepted search stops.
During search, unemployed individuals enjoy some flow real return b (typ-
ically including the value of leisure and unemployment insurance benefits,
net of the cost of search) and discount future incomes at the instantaneous
discount rate r. Under these assumptions we can use Bellman equations
to derive stationary values for unemployment and employment, respectively
denoted by Vn and Ve(w). The Bellman equation satisfied by the value of
unemployment is
rVn = b+ p
½Z
max [Vn, Ve(w)] dF (w)− Vn
¾
. (2)
The value of employment is given by
rVe(w) = w. (3)
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Trivially, the choice between Vn and Ve(w) inside the integral of (2) can be
described by a reservation rule. There exists a unique reservation wage w∗
such that Vn = Ve(w∗) = w∗/r. The reservation wage satisfies an equation
derived from (2),
w∗ = rVn = b+ p
Z
w∗
[Ve(w)− Vn] dF (w) (4)
= b+ prE(w − w
∗|w ≥ w∗) Pr(w ≥ w∗), (5)
which simplifies to
w∗ = 1r + h (rb+ hy(w
∗)), (6)
with h given by (1) and y(.) defined by the conditional expectation (or “trun-
cated mean function” of F ; see Burdett, 1981),
y(w∗) = E(w | w ≥ w∗)
=
Z
w∗
wdF (w)/(1− F (w∗)). (7)
Let now x be an element of the vector x, a parameter that influences p
but not F, and without loss of generality let p0(x) > 0. Diﬀerentiation of (1)
with respect to x yields
∂h
∂x = (1− F (w
∗))p0(x)− pF 0(w∗)∂w
∗
∂x , (8)
and from (6),
∂w∗
∂x =
p0(x)
r + h(1− F (w
∗))(y(w∗)− w∗) > 0. (9)
In general, ∂h/∂x is ambiguous, because the two terms in (8) have opposite
sign: the worker increases his reservation wage when the arrival of oﬀers
improves and this can oﬀset its direct positive eﬀect on the hazard rate.
Substitution from (9) into (8) yields
∂h
∂x = (1− F (w
∗))p0(x)
µ
1− hr + h
F 0(w∗)
1− F (w∗)(y(w
∗)− w∗)
¶
. (10)
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But making use again of (6) we find that
F 0(w∗)
1− F (w∗)(y(w
∗)− w∗) (11)
is the slope of the truncated mean function, denoted by y0(w∗). Thus, a
suﬃcient condition for a positive eﬀect of the oﬀer arrival rate on the hazard
rate is that the slope of the truncated mean function be less than 1. The
condition, however, is not necessary (although it becomes necessary as r →
0). Burdett (1981) argues that this property is satisfied by a large class of
distributions, and the literature usually assumes that the property holds,
so an improvement in the oﬀer arrival rate decreases the mean duration of
unemployment.
Consider next a parameter z that improves the wage oﬀer distribution,
i.e., let F depend on z such that F (w; z) stochastically dominates F (w; z0)
if z > z0. The eﬀect of a small displacement in z on the hazard rate is
∂h
∂z = −p
µ
∂F (w∗)
∂z + F
0(w∗)∂w
∗
∂z
¶
. (12)
By the stochastic dominance assumption made, ∂F (w∗)/∂z < 0, and from (6)
it immediately follows that ∂w∗/∂z > 0, so once again there is an ambiguity
in the eﬀects of an improvement in the oﬀer distribution. However, as in (1),
in our empirical work we restrict the estimation to shifts in the mean of the
lognormal wage oﬀer distribution, holding variance constant. The eﬀect is
still ambiguous but it can now be calculated and estimated.
The density of the lognormal is
f(w) = 1wσw
φ
µ
lnw − µ
σw
¶
, (13)
where φ(.) is the normal density
φ
µ
lnw − µ
σw
¶
=
1
(2π)0.5 exp
"
−1
2
µ
lnw − µ
σw
¶2#
. (14)
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The cumulative density of the lognormal is
F (w∗) = Φ
µ
lnw∗ − µ
σw
¶
, (15)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative normal density. By integration we can derive
Z
w∗
wdF (w) = exp
µ
1
2
σ2w + µ
¶·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − (σ2w + µ)
σw
¶¸
. (16)
With these expressions the reservation wage equation (6) becomes
w∗ =
rb+ p exp
¡
1
2
σ2w + µ
¢ ·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗−(σ2w+µ)
σw
¶¸
r + p
h
1− Φ
³
lnw∗−µ
σw
´i (17)
For any parameter z that influences the mean for the lognormal, (15)
yields
∂F (w∗)
∂z = −
µ0(z)
σw
φ
µ
lnw∗ − µ
σw
¶
=
F 0(w∗)
w∗ µ
0(z), (18)
so (12) becomes:
∂h
∂z = pF
0(w∗)w∗µ0(z)
µ
1− 1w∗µ0(z)
∂w∗
∂z
¶
. (19)
To derive the response of the reservation wage to the change in z we
diﬀerentiate (17) to derive
∂w∗
∂z =
p exp
¡
1
2
σ2w + µ
¢ ·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗−(σ2w+µ)
σw
¶¸
r + p
h
1− Φ
³
lnw∗−µ
σw
´i µ0(z), (20)
and so
1
w∗µ0(z)
∂w∗
∂z =
p exp
¡
1
2
σ2w + µ
¢ ·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗−(σ2w+µ)
σw
¶¸
rb+ p exp
¡
1
2
σ2w + µ
¢ h
1− Φ
³
lnw∗−(σ2w+µ)
σw
´i . (21)
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Comparison of (21) with (19) shows that if rb > 0 the eﬀect of higher z
(noting that by assumption µ0(z) > 0) is to raise the hazard; if rb = 0 the
hazard is unaﬀected by changes in the mean of the distribution and if rb < 0
the reservation wage overreacts and the hazard is lower.
Our empirical strategy is to use information on reservation wages and
unemployment durations to uncover the dependence of the oﬀer arrival rate
and the mean of the wage oﬀer distribution on the size of the local market
and other parameters. We explain how (1) and (6) can be used to construct
a likelihood function after a description of the data.
3 Data
The data used for this study come from the UK Survey of Incomes In and
Out of Work (SIIOW). This was a one-oﬀ survey that collected individual in-
formation on a representative sample of men and women who started a spell
of unemployment, and registered at any of the 88 Unemployment Benefit Of-
fices (UBO) selected, in the four weeks starting March 16, 1987. Information
on survey participants was collected from two separate personal interviews.
The first interviews were carried out shortly after unemployment began, be-
tween April and July 1987, and a total of 3003 interviews were completed.
The second interviews were held about nine months later, in January 1988,
on respondents who had been interviewed in 1987 and had consented to a
second interview. A total of 2146 interviews were completed at this second
stage. We use available information on all respondents interviewed once or
twice, by assuming that attrition between the first and second interview is
random.
The first interview focused on individuals’ personal characteristics and
their employment history during the 12 months prior to the interview, in-
11
cluding employment and unemployment income, type of job held and job
search activities while unemployed. The follow-up interview covered individ-
uals’ employment history since their first interview.
The data contain three types of unemployment spells. Completed spells,
by respondents who had found jobs by the time of the first or second inter-
view. Completed spells are measured by the number of weeks between the
date the worker signed at the UBO and the date he or she re-entered em-
ployment. The longest completed spells in the sample are between nine and
ten months. Censored spells, by respondents still unemployed at the time of
the second interview (or the first interview for those who only had one inter-
view), measured by the number of weeks between the date the respondent
registered at the UBO and the date of the interview. Censored spells, by
respondents who left the register without finding a job and who were out of
the labor force at the time of interview. This type of censored spell is mea-
sured by the number of weeks that the respondent was on the unemployment
register.3 We call the third type of spell a censored spell following the logic
of a competing risk duration model. Exits into jobs compete with exits into
other states but given that our focus is on the determinants of the exit into
jobs, all unemployment durations finishing with destinations other than jobs
are treated as censored (see Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993)
In addition to data on unemployment spells, we use information on worker
reservation wages and on their post-unemployment wages. The information
on reservation wages comes from the question “what is the lowest weekly take-
home pay you might consider accepting”, which is asked of all unemployed
workers, or the question “what is the lowest weekly take-home pay you might
3We assume that once a respondent leaves the unemployment register active search
ceases, since once on the register, no active searcher has an incentive to leave it, even if
entitlement to benefit ceases. The register for non-recipients of benefit provides free job
information which the job seeker is free to use or ignore.
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have considered accepting”, which is asked of those already employed at the
time of the first interview. We then obtain hourly reservation wages by using
information on the expected number of hours to be worked each week. Post-
unemployment hourly wages are constructed from a question on the usual
weekly take-home pay in the first job after the unemployment spell and a
question on the usual hours worked. Although for our purposes it would be
more appropriate to estimate the parameters of the pre-tax wage distribution,
better representing the productivity distribution across firms, we have no
choice but to estimate the distribution of take-home pay, as information on
the (subjective) pre-tax reservation wage is not available (and constructing
a tax schedule for each individual is also not feasible).
Using self-reported information on reservation wages involves a problem,
namely that it is not guaranteed that the reservation wage falls always be-
tween net unemployment income and the post-unemployment wage, as re-
quired by our model.4 We find that self-reported reservation wages are higher
than post-unemployment wages for 16% of observations in our sample. We
explain in the next section how we deal with this apparent discrepancy be-
tween theory and observation. It is a lot more diﬃcult to compare reported
wages with income during unemployment. In the absence of information on
the cost of search, we cannot directly compare reservation wages with net
unemployment income. A comparison of reservation wages with reported
unemployment income shows that unemployment benefits exceed reported
reservation wages in only 5% of our sample.5.
4In some cases, e.g. when having a job increases the entitlement to unemployment
compensation, it may be optimal to set the reservation wage below actual unemployment
income. See Mortensen (1977).
5Further tests on the reliability of the reservation wage information in the SIIOW
were carried out by Manning and Thomas (1997), who estimated both wage regressions
and unemployment duration models on these data. They showed that, consistent with
our search model, both post unemployment wages and unemployment duration depend
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The information on hourly reservation wages is missing for 773 workers.
1445 workers in the sample found a job within the survey period, while
1558 were still jobless at the time of the second interview or had left the
unemployment register. Among those who found jobs, the information on
the hourly take-home pay is missing in 330 cases. The final sample consists
of 2229 respondents, the missing ones being the 773 with no reservation wage
information and 1 observation with no age information. The 330 cases with
missing post-unemployment wage are included in the estimation by making
use of the information that they still convey; that the have had an oﬀer
exceeding their reservation wage. Some summary statistics of the sample
used are presented in Table 1.
As far as the characterization of local labor markets is concerned, we
merge individual records from the SIIOW with county-level data extracted
from the NOMIS database. For confidentiality reasons the SIIOW does not
attach explicit geographic identifiers to interviewees. The only geographical
information that is provided is the code of the UBO at which the worker is
registered. Using NOMIS information, we achieved a mapping between UBOs
and counties. Out of the 66 British counties, respondents in the SIIOW reside
in 43 of them. The county level information that we use in our estimates is
reported in Table 2.
A preliminary picture of the relationship between market size and the
quality of job matches can be gathered by regressing county mean wages
on market size. We compute mean wages by 2 educational groups and 43
positively on self-reported reservation wages. For more general discussion of the problems
and benefits involved in the use of self-reported reservation wage data see Lancaster and
Chesher (1983), who make use of two British surveys of unemployed workers (the P.E.P
survey of 1973 and the Oxford survey of 1971). More recently a number of authors have
used Dutch data on self-reported reservation wages, where econometric procedures are also
discussed, e.g., Van den Berg and Gorter (1997), Van den Berg (1990) and Bloemen and
Stancanelli (2001).
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Table 1: Sample characteristics of the unemployment inflow
Variables Whole sample Excluding London
Mean St.dev. No.obs. Mean St.dev. No.obs
% uncensored 52.7 2229 53.1 1962
% censored 47.3 2229 46.9 1962
uncensored duration 12.3 11.1 1174 12.2 11.0 1042
censored duration 23.9 17.4 1055 24.1 17.5 920
females 37.7 2229 37.2 1962
age 36.9 11.5 2229 36.8 11.5 1962
% skilled 43.4 2229 44.4 1962
hourly res. wage 2.38 0.98 2229 2.33 0.94 1962
hourly take-home pay 2.57 1.30 927 2.56 1.30 839
Notes. % Skilled : includes all those who attended school or vocational train-
ing courses until the age of 18, plus those with higher education. Hourly res.
wage: denotes the lowest weekly take-home pay that the worker considers
accepting, divided by the expected number of hours worked. Source: SIIOW.
counties, and regress them on an education dummy, the local labor market
tightness (denoted by θ), and the number of vacancies (also disaggregated
into 2 occupational groups, denoted by Vby skill) in each county. The results
are reported in Table 3. Local wages are positively correlated with the num-
ber of job openings, proxying market size, although the size eﬀect is only
significant for the whole sample.
We repeat the same exercise using mean completed unemployment du-
ration (by county) as the dependent variable. The resulting estimates are
reported in Table 4. In neither specification can any size eﬀect be detected.
4 Estimation specification
The likelihood contribution of an individual with an unemployment spell
length of di, and, in the case the spell is completed, a wage wi is
15
Table 2: Local labor markets in Britain
Variables Whole sample Excluding London
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Unemployed 59986 68698 52380 47817
Vacancies 4140 5639 3349 2229
Tightness 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03
Skilled vacancies 1072 1614 846 648
Unskilled vacancies 2710 3397 2242 1484
Firms 26118 30463 21867 12432
Average firm size 15.8 4.3 15.7 4.3
Area size (acres) 347258 431079 351767 435277
No. of observations 43 42
Notes. Unemployed : number of claimant unemployed, April 1987. Va-
cancies: vacancies notified at Job Centres, April 1987. Tightness: vacan-
cies/unemployed. Skilled vacancies: vacancies notified at Job Centres, March
1987, in the following KOS occupations: managerial; professional: support-
ing; professional (education, welfare); literary, artistics, sports; professional
(science, engineering); managerial (excluding general); clerical and related.
Unskilled vacancies: vacancies notified at Job Centres, March 1987, in the fol-
lowing KOS occupations: selling; security and protective; catering, cleaning,
etc.; farming, fishing and related; processing (excl. metal); making/repairing;
processing (metal./elect.); repetitive assembling, etc.; construction, mining;
transport operating; miscellaneous. Firms: stock of VAT registered busi-
nesses at the end of 1986. Average firm size: employment/firms. Area size:
area of county, in acres. Source: NOMIS.
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Table 3: Mean wages and labor market size
Whole sample Excluding London
constant 0.237
(0.166)
0.377
(0.194)
skilled 0.247
(0.033)
0.233
(0.038)
log (θ) −0.099
(0.035)
−0.110
(0.036)
log (Vby skill) 0.042
(0.015)
0.018
(0.023)
R2 0.45 0.45
No. Obs. 85 83
Notes. The dependent variable is the (log) mean wage across 2 educational
groups and 43 counties. Source: SIIOW and NOMIS.
Table 4: Mean durations and labor market size
Whole sample Excluding London
constant 1.873
(0.310)
2.143
(0.404)
skilled −0.169
(0.062)
−0.192
(0.072)
log (θ) −0.168
(0.066)
−0.186
(0.067)
log (Vby skill) 0.021
(0.028)
−0.023
(0.043)
R2 0.17 0.16
No. Obs. 85 83
Notes. The dependent variable is the (log) mean completed unemployment
duration across 2 educational groups and 43 counties. Source: SIIOW and
NOMIS.
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Li = exp [−pPr (w ≥ w∗) di] [ pPr (w ≥ w∗|wi) Pr(wi)]ci
= exp [−pPr (w ≥ w∗) di] [ pf(wi)]ci , (22)
where ci is a censoring indicator that takes value 1 if the unemployment spell
is completed and 0 otherwise (we ignore for the moment workers with com-
pleted spells but missing post-unemployment wage). Under the log-normality
assumptions, (22) becomes
Li = exp
½
−p
·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − µ
σw
¶¸
di
¾·
p 1wiσw
φ
µ
lnwi − µ
σw
¶¸ci
. (23)
The parameters of the model can be estimated by maximizing the log
likelihood of a sample of n observations, logL =
Pn
i=1 logLi, with Li given
by (23), with respect to p, w∗, µ and σw, under the restriction imposed by
(17) and w∗ > 0. The availability of data on reservation wages in our data
set avoids a problem often encountered by studies that have to estimate the
reservation wage. Flinn and Heckman (1982) show that if observed wages
are measured without error, the maximum likelihood estimator for w∗ is the
minimum accepted wage w. But this method implies that the reservation
wage can not be greater than any observed wage in the sample, so the pres-
ence of outliers in the observed wage distribution disproportionately aﬀect
the results, by attributing the distance between the observed wage and the
reservation wage to unobservable or chance events.
When we use reported reservation wage data for w∗, it is no longer guar-
anteed that realized wages always exceed reservation wages. In the context of
the empirical model an observation with w < w∗ has a zero likelihood, as the
distribution of realized wages should be truncated from below at the reser-
vation wage. But the inconsistency between theory and observation arises
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only if both reservation wages and post-unemployment wages are measured
without error. We generalize the empirical model by assuming that post-
unemployment wages are measured with error, i.e., we let lnw0 = lnw + u,
where w denotes the wage oﬀer received by the worker and w0 our obser-
vation of the wage. The measurement error u is assumed to be normally
distributed with 0 mean and variance σ2u, and independent of w. Therefore
observed wages w0 are log-normally distributed, with mean µ and variance
σ2 = σ2w + σ2u.6 Under these assumptions, the probability of receiving an ac-
ceptable oﬀer remains 1− Φ [(lnw∗ − µ)/σw], and the joint probability that
the wage exceeds the reservation wage and that w0 is observed is
Pr(w ≥ w∗|w0) Pr(w0) = (24)·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − ρ2 lnw0 − (1− ρ2)µ
ρσu
¶¸
p 1w0σφ
µ
lnw0 − µ
σ
¶
,
where ρ2 = σ2w/σ2 represents the share of observed wage variation which is
not explained by the measurement error. The resulting likelihood is
Li = exp
½
−p
·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − µ
σw
¶¸
di
¾
(25)·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − ρ2 lnw0 − (1− ρ2)µ
ρσu
¶¸ci ·
p 1w0σφ
µ
lnw0 − µ
σ
¶¸ci
.
Finally we need to allow for the existence of respondents who complete an un-
employment spell but do not provide information on their post-unemployment
wage. The information that is conveyed by these observations is that they
6The assumption that wages are measured with error is used in the estimation of
structural search models by Wolpin (1987), Christensen and Kiefer (1994) and Eckstein
and Wolpin (1995). An alternative to introducing measurement error in wages is to assume
that the utility derived from jobs is determined by the wage and some non-monetary
attributes, i.e. utility = logw + u, where u is the non-monetary component to the utility
from the job, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2u. This latter approach,
adopted by Manning and Thomas (1997) for estimating the predictions of a shirking
model à la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), delivers a very similar likelihood function to the
one estimated here.
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have had an oﬀer exceeding their reservation wage, so, taking this into ac-
count, our likelihood function generalizes to
Li = exp
½
−p
·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − µ
σw
¶¸
di
¾½
p
·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − µ
σw
¶¸¾ci
(26)·
1− Φ
µ
lnw∗ − ρ2 lnw0 − (1− ρ2)µ
ρσu
¶¸eci ·
p 1w0σφ
µ
lnw0 − µ
σ
¶¸eci
,
where ci is equal to one for all completed spells and zero otherwise, and eci
is equal to one for all completed spells with a non-missing wage and zero
otherwise.
Equation (26) is maximized with respect to p, µ, σw and σu. Note that
in order to deliver both reservation wage and realized wage heterogeneity
the model needs to allow for individual heterogeneity in at least one of the
parameters p, µ, σw, σu. We introduce heterogeneity in both p and µ, as
explained in the next Section.
Data on both unemployment duration and post-unemployment wages al-
low us to separately identify the eﬀect of variables included in p, µ or both
(see Flinn and Heckman, 1982 and Wolpin, 1987 for detailed discussions of
identification issues in stationary search models). In practice, however, iden-
tification may turn out to be a delicate issue when the same covariates are
included in the specification of both p and µ, because of missing information
on post-unemployment wages due to censoring or non-reporting. With this
caveat in mind, we present alternative specifications for p and µ as a check
of the robustness of our estimates.
5 Results
The estimates presented here are based on the likelihood function (26), in
which σw and σu are estimated as constant parameters, and p and µ are
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functions of both individual and labor market characteristics.7 Either theory
or well-established empirical regularities help determine which labor market
variables should aﬀect p and which µ. Search theory predicts that the arrival
rate of job oﬀers should depend on labor market tightness θ = V/U , which is
therefore included in the determination of p. A well known stylized fact is the
employer size-wage eﬀect, according to which large firms pay higher wages
than smaller firms.8 As we cannot track down individual information on
employer size, we capture the size-wage eﬀect by including the local average
firm size in the determination of µ.We estimate the eﬀect of market size with
four alternative measures, the number of vacancies by broad skill category,
the total number of vacancies, employment, and the number of firms. Our
specification of p and µ is
p = exp(α0 + α1female+ α2skilled+ α3 log age+ α4 log θ + α5 log size);
µ = β0 + β1female+ β2skilled+ β3 log age+ β4 log firmsize+ β5 log size.
Our estimated model is only semi-structural in the sense that no structural
model is imposed to specify p and µ. In our estimation strategy, we relied
as much as possible on observables, using a structural approach only when
crucial for addressing the main point of this work, namely the presence of
scale eﬀects in diﬀerent stages of the job search process. In our specification,
we restrict the arrival rate of job oﬀers to be non-negative, and its log-
linear relationship with market tightness bears close resemblance with most
existing matching function estimates. Wage oﬀers are specified as log-linear
7We attempted to include scale eﬀects in the variance of the wage oﬀer distribution, σw,
but our estimation programme did not achieve convergence. Note, however, that under
the log-normal assumptions, the variance of wages depends positively on the mean log
wage, i.e. V ar(w) = exp(2µ+ σ2w)[exp(σ2w)− 1]. If there are scale eﬀects in the log of the
mean wage oﬀer, these also show up in the dispersion of the level of wages.
8The literature is surveyed by Brown and Medoﬀ (1989).
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functions of human capital variables, as it is typically the case in Mincerian
wage equations, to which we add size controls.
The results are presented in Table 5. In column 1 we do not include
size indicators in either p or µ, and we find a fairly familiar picture of the
determinants of the arrival rate of job oﬀers and wage distributions. Men,
the highly educated and older workers sample wage oﬀers from a distribution
that stochastically dominates that for women, the less skilled and the young,
respectively. Markets in which the average firm size is larger are associated
with higher wage oﬀers on average, although this eﬀect is not significantly
diﬀerent from zero. Arrival rates of job oﬀers are higher for the highly edu-
cated and for younger workers. In line with much of the matching-function
literature, job oﬀers positively depend on labor market tightness, and the
elasticity of p with respect to θ, close to 0.3, is comparable with the results
obtained by several estimates based on aggregate British data.
It may be argued that the relevant tightness measure is not the aggregate
one, simply computed as the number of total vacancies to total unemploy-
ment in the local market, but one which is skill-specific. In the presence of
market segmentation, with skilled and unskilled workers applying to diﬀerent
sets of jobs, the relevant tightness measure for a given worker should be given
by the vacancy/unemployment ratio in the relevant skill segment. Although
we have data on vacancies disaggregated by occupation, data on unemployed
workers disaggregated by skills are not available at the county level. We
therefore tried to pick the eﬀect of tightness by skill by including a measure
of relative tightness in p, given by Vby skill/V. This variable is included in
column 2 and is highly significant. As our measure of market size is based
on the number of vacancies in each worker’s skill segment, controlling for
relative market tightness is crucial if we are to attain a consistent estimate
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Table 5: Estimation results - Whole sample
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
µ
constant −0.378
(0.198)
−0.379
(0.199)
−0.613
(0.186)
−0.582
(0.190)
−0.374
(0.193)
−0.307
(0.469)
female −0.256
(0.032)
−0.256
(0.032)
−0.259
(0.031)
−0.259
(0.031)
−0.256
(0.032)
−0.259
(0.031)
skilled 0.201
(0.037)
0.200
(0.037)
0.248
(0.037)
0.245
(0.035)
0.200
(0.036)
0.248
(0.036)
log(age) 0.386
(0.042)
0.387
(0.042)
0.391
(0.041)
0.391
(0.041)
0.387
(0.042)
0.390
(0.042)
log(firmsize) 0.057
(0.047)
0.056
(0.047)
0.010
(0.048)
0.008
(0.049)
0.054
(0.047)
0.021
(0.065)
log (Vby skill) 0.043
(0.016)
0.040
(0.015)
0.040
(0.014)
log(acres) −0.015
(0.021)
p
constant −1.732
(0.446)
−1.531
(0.464)
−1.381
(0.567)
−1.638
(0.473)
−1.618
(0.560)
−1.656
(0.470)
female 0.009
(0.077)
0.012
(0.079)
0.012
(0.078)
0.013
(0.077)
0.012
(0.077)
0.014
(0.076)
skilled 0.484
(0.085)
0.899
(0.181)
0.872
(0.181)
0.868
(0.185)
0.896
(0.180)
0.865
(0.185)
log(age) −0.273
(0.102)
−0.268
(0.103)
−0.269
(0.102)
−0.267
(0.103)
−0.267
(0.103)
−0.265
(0.102)
log(θ) 0.293
(0.073)
0.305
(0.074)
0.284
(0.075)
0.273
(0.076)
0.301
(0.076)
0.268
(0.075)
log (Vby skill/V ) 0.431
(0.177)
0.432
(0.178)
0.400
(0.181)
0.420
(0.179)
0.399
(0.180)
log (Vby skill) −0.026
(0.042)
0.009
(0.039)
σw 0.368
(0.016)
0.368
(0.016)
0.367
(0.016)
0.367
(0.016)
0.368
(0.016)
0.367
(0.016)
σu 0.301
(0.016)
0.301
(0.016)
0.297
(0.014)
0.297
(0.014)
0.301
(0.016)
0.297
(0.014)
log(lik) -7120.5 -7115.9 -7109.9 -7110.2 -7115.8 -7109.8
Notes. Robust standard errors (for clustered data) reported in brackets. No
of observations: 2229. Source: SIIOW and NOMIS.
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of the size eﬀect.
The eﬀect of market size on arrival rates and mean wage oﬀers is ob-
tained from the estimates in columns 3-5. Column 3 includes the number
of vacancies among the determinants of both p and µ. Vacancies here are
disaggregated into two broad occupational groups, skilled and unskilled (see
notes to Table 2). We find that local labor market size has a positive eﬀect
on the mean wage oﬀer distribution, but not on the arrival rate of job oﬀers.
In columns 4 and 5 we test for the eﬀect of vacancies on p and µ separately.
The eﬀect of size on µ stays positive and practically unchanged from column
3, while the one on p is virtually zero.
We further investigate whether the eﬀects that we estimated are not due
to the absolute size of the local market but to its density. In column 6 we
drop the size eﬀect from p, and include both the number of vacancies and
the geographical size of the local market in µ. If density matters, we expect
a negative and significant coeﬃcient on log(acres), once size is accounted for
by log (Vby skill) . If only density matters, as opposed to size, the coeﬃcients
on log (Vby skill) and log(acres) should not diﬀer from each other in absolute
value.We find that the eﬀect of log (Vby skill) on µ remains largely unchanged
from the one in column 4, and that the one on log(acres) is negative, but
not significantly diﬀerent from zero. It should also be noted that the coef-
ficients on log (Vby skill) and log(acres) do not diﬀer significantly from each
other in absolute value (with a p-value of 0.19). But we do not consider
this to be evidence that density matters more than size because of the high
standard error on the coeﬃcient on log(acres), which admits a large range of
parameters not significantly diﬀerent from it. As a final check, we included
size and density separately, proxied by log (Vby skill) and log (Vby skill/acres)
respectively (results not reported). Although neither of them was significant
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at conventional levels, the size eﬀect was more important than the density
eﬀect, with t-statistics of 1.3 and 0.9 respectively.9
Given that we have data on a number of county level indicators, we also
measured size eﬀects by making use of the alternative variables of total num-
ber of vacancies (not disaggregated by occupation), the number of registered
businesses and the employment level. Previous studies (not of search mar-
kets) used mainly employment or output measures of size. The total number
of vacancies was significant in our regressions but the results were very similar
to those reported in Table 5. The other variables gave imprecise estimates.
Given the nature of our search problem, however, we should note that on a
priori grounds the number of job oﬀers available (measured by job vacancies)
is a better measure of size from the point of view of job seekers, than the
alternatives.
We noted that London is an outlier in our cross-section of counties. In
order to check the robustness of the estimated size eﬀect we perform the
same set of estimates in Table 5 on a sub-sample which excludes London.
The results obtained are reported in Table 6. When we do not include any
size indicator in either p or µ (columns 1 and 2), the results are similar
to those obtained on the whole sample. But when we include vacancies
(disaggregated by occupation) as a proxy for market size, we do not find any
size eﬀect in matching rates, coming either through the mean wage oﬀer or
the arrival rate of job oﬀers.
Making use of estimates from the regression 4 of Table 5, which is our
9Size and density eﬀects in economic activity have been previously studied by Ciccone
and Hall (1996), who estimate the eﬀect of both county size (proxied by output) and
county density (proxied by output per acre) on output per worker in the United States.
Our study diﬀers in the measurement of the variables of interest, but also in the results, as
Ciccone and Hall find that density eﬀects are (slightly) more important than size eﬀects.
Density eﬀects were found to be significant by Coles and Smith (1996) in the estimation
of a matching function for travel-to-work areas in England and Wales.
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Table 6: Estimation results - Excluding London
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
µ
constant −0.386
(0.200)
−0.388
(0.199)
−0.329
(0.227)
−0.348
(0.232)
−0.384
(0.197)
female −0.278
(0.032)
−0.277
(0.032)
−0.277
(0.032)
−0.277
(0.032)
−0.277
(0.032)
skilled 0.202
(0.028)
0.202
(0.028)
0.193
(0.031)
0.195
(0.031)
0.202
(0.032)
log(age) 0.402
(0.042)
0.404
(0.042)
0.403
(0.042)
0.403
(0.043)
0.404
(0.042)
log(firmsize) 0.032
(0.043)
0.031
(0.043)
0.036
(0.045)
0.036
(0.043)
0.029
(0.042)
log (Vby skill) −0.009
(0.017)
−0.007
(0.017)
log(firms)
p
constant −1.733
(0.486)
−1.488
(0.495)
−1.660
(0.668)
−1.482
(0.494)
−1.612
(0.653)
female 0.057
(0.078)
0.061
(0.079)
0.061
(0.079)
0.061
(0.079)
0.060
(0.080)
skilled 0.509
(0.090)
0.989
(0.185)
0.994
(0.186)
0.994
(0.186)
0.988
(0.185)
log(age) −0.291
(0.113)
−0.287
(0.114)
−0.286
(0.114)
−0.287
(0.114)
−0.286
(0.114)
log(θ) 0.276
(0.079)
0.294
(0.079)
0.298
(0.079)
0.297
(0.079)
0.296
(0.079)
log (Vby skill/V ) 0.487
(0.178)
0.470
(0.190)
0.493
(0.179)
0.470
(0.190)
log (Vby skill) 0.022
(0.057)
0.015
(0.054)
σw 0.354
(0.015)
0.353
(0.015)
0.353
(0.015)
0.353
(0.015)
0.353
(0.015)
σu 0.283
(0.014)
0.283
(0.014)
0.283
(0.014)
0.283
(0.014)
0.283
(0.014)
log(lik) -6287.4 -6281.7 -6281.5 -6281.6 -6281.6
Notes. Robust standard errors (for clustered data) reported in brackets. No
of observations: 1962. Source: SIIOW and NOMIS.
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preferred specification for the full sample, we compute the predicted arrival
rates and mean wage oﬀers for markets of diﬀerent sizes. Also, with these
estimates we compute the reservation wage that is implied by the optimal
search strategy that we used in our estimation, as given by equation (17).
Our predictions are computed setting r = 0.005 for the weekly discount
rate,10 for two alternative values of b (b = 0 and b = 40% of the average
wage). With data on predicted reservation wages, we compute acceptance
rates, hazard rates and realized wages for the average market and for the
largest market in our sample. The results are reported in Table 7.
The table shows that, when b = 0, moving from the average to the largest
market size raises the mean wage oﬀer by 9.2%. As predicted by the model
of Section 2 for rb = 0, the consequent increase in reservation wages com-
pletely oﬀsets any eﬀect of better job oﬀers on the re-employment hazard.
Higher job oﬀers are simply translated into an equiproportional increase in
realized wages. When b is equal to 40% of the average wage, and therefore
rb > 0, higher job oﬀers translate into a 8.8% increase in realized wages
and a 1.9% increase in the re-employment hazard. Noting that b is measur-
ing unemployment income that has to be given up when moving to a job,
net of search costs, a number such as 40% is high and above the average
replacement ratio for the UK in the late 1980s. Yet, the split between a
post-unemployment wage eﬀect and a duration eﬀect of scale is firmly in
favor of the post-unemployment wage eﬀect.
The split of the eﬀects of scale in favor of post-unemployment wages may
10Thi s impl ies an annu al rate of ab out 30%. In our s imple mo del, t he d i scount
factor is the interest rate, however in models with limited job durations it is the sum of
the interest rate and the job separation rate. New jobs last about five years in the UK,
but because this group of workers is less skilled durations may even be shorter. So an
annu al job s eparation rate f or these workers of 20 to 25% is reasonabl e. In case
0.005 is regarded as too high, we note that the smaller the weekly discount rate that we
use, the more support there is for the points made in the text that follows.
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Table 7: Comparatice statics for the eﬀect of market size
r = 0.005
b = 0
r = 0.005
b = 0.4E(w|w > w∗)
Local market: Local market:
Variables Average size London Average size London
Mean wage oﬀer 3.773
(0.770)
4.121
(0.849)
3.773
(0.770)
4.121
(0.849)
Arrival rate 0.044
(0.020)
0.044
(0.020)
0.044
(0.020)
0.044
(0.020)
Acceptance rate 0.485
(0.087)
0.485
(0.087)
0.395
(0.073)
0.403
(0.074)
Hazard rate 0.020
(0.006)
0.020
(0.006)
0.016
(0.007)
0.017
(0.008)
Realized wage 4.706
(1.024)
5.141
(1.131)
4.905
(1.018)
5.338
(1.125)
Notes. All predictions are based on the estimates of column 4 in Table 5. The
average market size is calibrated using the average number vacancies across
counties (1072 skilled and 2710 unskilled vacancies). The size of London
is calibrated using the local number of vacancies (10559 skilled and 22335
unskilled vacancies). Arrival, acceptance and hazard rates are values per
week. Mean wage oﬀers and realized wages are values per hour. Standard
errors are reported in brackets.
explain why scale eﬀects that are present at the micro level do not show
up in matching-function estimation, or indeed in hazard-rate estimation. At
reasonable benefit replacement ratios, net of search costs, the eﬀect of scale
on the hazard is too small, relative to the observed cross-sectional variations
in hazard rates, to be picked up in reduced-form estimates. The eﬀect of
size translates mainly to a higher wage rate, which should be picked up in
reduced-form estimates of regional wages.11
11Tests by Glaeser and Maré (2001) for the US and Combes et al. (2002) for France are
consistent with this prediction.
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6 Another Lo ok into the Black Box of Match-
ing
Our results lead to an unexpected finding about the properties of hazard
rates, and by extension about the structure of the aggregate matching func-
tion. The finding that by influencing the mean of the distribution of wage
oﬀers size aﬀects only the post-unemployment wage distribution, but not haz-
ard rates, is general. Shift variables in the distribution of wage oﬀers induce
a response from the reservation wage which shifts the post-unemployment
wage distribution, but have virtually no impact on hazard rates. In contrast,
variables that influence the mechanics of the meeting technology, which de-
termines the oﬀer arrival rate, have a very small impact on reservation wages
and the post-unemployment wage. Their main influence is on the hazard
rate.
This finding is ironic given theoretical results on hazard rates. Theory
generally gives an unambiguous answer to the question of the eﬀects of shifts
on the wage oﬀer distribution: that generally, hazard rates should rise when
the distribution shifts to the right, unless unemployment income shifts with
it. But theory gives an ambiguous answer to the question of shifts in the
oﬀer arrival rate. Yet, the empirical estimates tell us that the variables that
matter for diﬀerences in hazard rates operate through the oﬀer arrival rate.
Naturally, the prediction that rightward shifts in the wage oﬀer distribution
increase the hazard is correct, but the eﬀect is small enough to be ignored.
We illustrate these findings with two more tables. Table 8 shows the
impact of tightness on the hazard rate and the post-unemployment wage
at net unemployment income b = 40% of the average wage. Unlike size,
tightness influences the oﬀer arrival rate, and so its main influence is on the
hazard rate. A market with 28.4% higher oﬀer arrival rate ends up with a
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Table 8: Comparative statics for the eﬀect of market tightness
r = 0.005
b = 0.4E(w|w > w∗)
Local market:
Variables mean θ (0.08) high θ (0.20) %
Mean wage oﬀer 4.183
(0.0.897)
4.183
(0.897)
Arrival rate 0.046
(0.020)
0.058
(0.026)
+28.4
Acceptance rate 0.513
(0.093)
0.454
(0.091)
-11.4
Hazard rate 0.023
(0.010)
0.026
(0.011)
+13.7
Realized wage 5.137
(1.100)
5.279
(1.132)
+2.8
Notes. All predictions are based on the estimates of column 4 in Table 5.
Arrival, acceptance and hazard rates are values per week. Mean wage oﬀers
and realized wages are values per hour. Standard errors are reported in
brackets.
13.7% higher hazard rate but only 2.8% higher average wage rate. Perhaps
surprisingly, in our estimates tightness has only a small influence on the mean
wage rate of a county by truncating the distribution of accepted wages, and
not by influencing each individual’s wage. In aggregate matching function
estimation tightness is the main independent variable driving the results, and
our calculations in Table 8 confirm these findings.
In Table 9 we show the eﬀect of the individual’s educational level on
the hazard, which works through both the wage oﬀer distribution and the
oﬀer arrival rate. The table shows that the eﬀect through the arrival rate
is reflected mainly in the hazard rate, whereas the eﬀect through the wage
distribution is picked up by the reservation wage and reflected mostly in the
average post-unemployment wage rate.
The implications for the microfoundations of the aggregate matching
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Table 9: Comparative statics for the eﬀect of education
r = 0.005
b = 0.4E(w|w > w∗)
education level
Variables Low high in p % high in µ % high in both %
Mean wage oﬀer 3.732
(0.654)
3.732
(0.654)
4.770
(0.836)
+27.8 4.770
(0.836)
+27.8
Arrival rate 0.027
(0.004)
0.065
(0.009)
+38.2 0.027
(0.004)
0.065
(0.009)
+38.2
Acceptance rate 0.604
(0.111)
0.404
(0.106)
-33.1 0.629
(0.110)
+4.2 0.422
(0.108)
-30.2
Hazard rate 0.016
(0.727)
0.026
(0.007)
+59.3 0.017
(0.003)
+4.3 0.027
(0.007)
+66.3
Realized wage 4.401
(0.727)
4.831
(0.815)
+9.8 5.566
(0.110)
+26.5 6.121
(1.043)
+39.1
Notes. All predictions are based on the estimates of column 4 in Table 5.
Arrival, acceptance and hazard rates are values per week. Mean wage oﬀers
and realized wages are values per hour. Standard errors are reported in
brackets.
function are important. Theory needs to concentrate on the mechanics of the
meeting technology if it is to understand the structure of matching functions.
The structure of the wage oﬀer distribution and the formulas for reservation
wages are not as important. They are important for determining the wage
outcomes of search processes, not the duration of search.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we argued that the fact that the vast majority of empirical
estimates find that there are no scale eﬀects in aggregate matching functions
does not necessarily mean that they are not present at the micro level. We
have shown that scale eﬀects in the quality of matches or in the arrival rate
of oﬀers can coexist with constant returns at the aggregate level. Specifically,
workers raise their reservation wages in markets characterized by scale eﬀects
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so as to oﬀset their impact on the aggregate matching function. Because of
this, the impact of scale eﬀects is primarily on the mean level of accepted
wages, and this should be picked up in wage regressions. We have not done
these tests ourselves but our findings are consistent with the empirical liter-
ature that finds local size eﬀects on wages and labor productivity.
Our findings generalize to other variables, which sheds light on the struc-
ture of aggregate matching functions. Generally, shift variables in the distri-
bution of wage oﬀers influence the post-unemployment wage distribution but
not the hazard rate, through their eﬀect on the reservation wage. But shift
variables in the oﬀer arrival rate influence the hazard rate (and by exten-
sion the aggregate matching function) with little influence in the expected
post-unemployment wage rate.
Our results should be qualified by noting that scale eﬀects disappear in a
subsample which excludes London (representing 12% of observations). One
possibility is that London is characterized by other unique features which
drive the results and which we have not identified. But our estimates ad-
mit also the intuitive interpretation that scale eﬀects in the quality of job
matches emerge only in very large markets, where choice is really superior to
the choice available in smaller markets. More specifically, comparing say a
county of 1 million employed people with one of 0.2 million (say Birmingham
and Southampton) we may not be able to find that the bigger choice of jobs
available in Birmingham really makes much of a diﬀerence to the quality of
job matches between it and Southampton. But in a city that supports em-
ployment of 3 million people (in reality even more within travelling distance)
the available choice is more likely to be rich enough to accommodate spe-
cialist talents and push up average wages. More research on diﬀerent data
sets and countries is needed here to uncover the true causes of scale eﬀects,
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if indeed they exist. Estimates with data from countries with more than one
large local market would be particularly important in this context.
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